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CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK
CITY OF NEW YORK
People v. Larsen'
(decided July 30, 2010)
Defendants Thomas Larsen and Edward Wardle were charged
with "displaying and offering for sale condoms on the street without
a general vendor license" 2 in violation of section 20-453 of New
York's Administrative Code.3 The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, 4 claiming that their First Amendment right to unencumbered
political speech' was violated by this New York statute because the
condom wrappers included printed political messages6  that
constituted a "written matter" exception to the statute.7 The Criminal
Court of the City of New York held that the statute was a valid
restriction on speech and thus respected the First Amendment.
At two separate locations in Manhattan, defendants Larsen
and Wardle were selling condoms labeled as either "Obama
Condoms" or "Palin Condoms."9 Neither defendant possessed a
license from the NYC Department of Consumer Affairs to sell such
' 906 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
2 Id. at 710.
3 N.Y. CITY COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 20, § 20-453 (2009) (stating that it is "unlawful
for any individual to act as a general vendor without having first obtained a license ...
except that is shall be lawful for a general vendor who hawks, peddles, sells or offers to sell,
at retail, only newspapers, periodicals, books, pamphlets or other similar written matter").
4 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 710 n. 1 (noting that defendants filed separate motions, but they
were consolidated because they addressed the same issues).
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech
. . ."). See also N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.").
6 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
7 Id.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 710.
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merchandise.'o The "Obama Condoms" had an image of the now
forty-fourth President of the United States on one side of the wrapper
with the heading "HOPE IS NOT A FORM OF PROTECTION.""
On the other side of the wrapper, a message explained that this
product served as "a call to action" for Obama "that hope is not
enough and responsibility is needed."' 2 The message was also meant
to promote responsible sexual behavior.' 3 A second Obama Condom
read "THE ULTIMATE STIMULUS PACKAGE," which sought "to
get people laid, not laid off."' 4 This particular message was intended
to "call attention to the severity of [the United States] economic
state." 5 The Palin Condoms included an image of the former Vice-
Presidential candidate at the forefront of an Alaskan-like setting and a
heading that read "WHEN ABORTION IS NOT AN OPTION," with
a footnote that read "As Thin As Her Resume."' 6 The other side of
the wrapper stated that this message sought to "take[] aim at both
[Sarah Palin] and the Republican Party's stance on a woman's right
to choose" because without the option of abortion, "condoms become
of the utmost importance."17 The condoms were the product of
Practice Safe Policy ("PSP"), and the court took judicial notice that
PSP's company goal was to divert the consumer's attention from
"minor concerns like the war, the economy or healthcare and instead
focus on the truly important issue of the day: Practicing Safe Policy
in the bedroom."' 8 Due to the political nature of these messages, the
defendants argued that such speech was protected by the First
Amendment and could not subject them to criminal liability under
section 20-453 of the New York City Administrative Code.' 9
The Criminal Court of the City of New York denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the condoms represented
a form of commercial speech that was not subject to the same First
Amendment protections as political speech, and therefore did not
10 Id
11 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
12 id.
13 Id.
14 id
15 Id.
16 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
7 Id.
8 Id.at710-11.
SId. at 711.
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exclude the defendants' acts from criminal liability. 20 The court
explored the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence on First
Amendment protections and the federal court applications of such
precedent to address: (1) whether the condom wrappers constituted
an "other written matter" First Amendment exception to the statute
and (2) whether the condoms warranted First Amendment protections
as a form of commercial speech. 21 First, the court held that the
condom wrappers were not contemplated in the "other written
matter" exception because the defendants were engaging in
commercial speech that was " 'primarily concerned with providing
information about the characteristics and costs of goods and
services,' "22 and such speech was not "fully protected speech." 23
The court synthesized relevant United States Supreme Court and
federal court precedent to promulgate categories that distinguished
between forms of expression that would or would not be protected by
the First Amendment.24 Specifically, it set out to determine whether
the condom wrappers were forms of expressing a meaningful
ideology or belief system that was protected by the First Amendment,
or whether the condom's message served such a purely commercial
purpose where the First Amendment protections would not apply.25
However, the absence of congruent Supreme Court commercial
speech principles has led to inconsistent jurisprudence in the field.26
The court acknowledged that items like literature, periodicals,
and pieces of art have all been recognized as vehicles for expressive
speech that should be protected by the First Amendment.27 However,
it affirmatively held that not all printed material was subject to the
protections of the First Amendment, otherwise that exception would
swallow up the rule.28 The sale of goods with political messages may
20 See id. at 717-18.
21 See Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 717-18.
22 Id. at 716-18 (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1980)).
23 Idat717.
24 Id at 711-13.
25 Id. at 717.
26 See Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model For Commercial Speech and
Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2836, 2857 (2005) [hereinafter Note, Making Sense
ofHybrid Speech].
27 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (quoting Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d
Cir. 1996)).
28 Id. at 718.
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warrant First Amendment protections when the merchandise is
"intertwined with 'informative and perhaps persuasive speech'
seeking support for particular causes." 29 However, if the speech's
sole purpose is to "attract attention to a commercial enterprise," then
it may not be constitutionally protected speech. 30 The court held that
simply because the product's marketing campaign tied the condoms
to current political events, the primary purpose was to make a profit
rather than express an idea or belief.3' The condom wrappers had a
"dominant non-expressive purpose" that rendered them outside the
scope of First Amendment protection.32
Subsequently, the court explored whether the commercial
speech that the condom wrappers expressed was in the narrow class
of such speech that warranted constitutional protection.33 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held that section 20-453
was a "content-neutral regulation," meaning that it did not favor one
form of expression over another in its regulation.34 In order for such
a regulation to remain constitutional, it must be "reasonable,
narrowly tailored to serve[] a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels for communication." 35 The
statute was held to be reasonable and narrowly tailored because it did
not target particular speech, but subjected all forms of speech to the
regulation. Also, there were significant government interests in the
statute such as: "(1) keeping the public streets free of congestion for
the convenience and safety of its citizens; (2) maintaining the 'tax
base and economic viability of the City;' and (3) preventing the sale
of 'stolen, defective or counterfeit merchandise.' "37 Lastly, the
statute did not prohibit alternative means of communicating the
speech because the defendants were able to distribute the condoms
for free, or sell the products to retailers who are able to sell the
29 Id. at 716 (quoting Vill. ofSchaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633).
30 Id at 716-17.
31 Id. at 717.
32 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
33 id.
34 Id. at 718 (quoting Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir.
2006)).
3s Id.
36 Id.
3 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (quoting Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 99).
506 [Vol. 27
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condoms to the general public in compliance with the statute.38
Section 20-453 only limits where the vendor can sell without a
license and where he can sell to make a profit. 39 Because the condom
wrappers did not constitute "other written matter," but rather
constituted commercial speech that was not protected by the First
Amendment, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 40
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech." 4 1 This amendment was a conscious effort by the Framers
"to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." 42  The
intention behind the amendment was to create "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 43 because speech regarding
matters of public concern "is the essence of self-government.""
Because of the importance of such speech, it "occupies 'the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to
special protection."4 5 This protection is not solely for "written or
spoken words, but also [shields] 'pictures, films, paintings, drawings,
and engravings.' "46 It can have the profound effect of protecting
both the noblest causeS47 and the most repugnant. 48
However, content-based restrictions on certain forms of
speech, such as in the areas of securities regulation, evidence law,
and contract law have remained scantly touched by this
38Id.
39 Id.
40 id
41 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
42 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
43 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
45 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
4 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 711 (quoting Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973)).
47 NAACP, 458 U.S. at 926-28 (holding that nonviolent protests against racially
discriminatory practices warrant First Amendment protection).
48 Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, 2011 WL 709517, at *10-11 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2011)
(holding that a protest of a marine's funeral using graphically homophobic signage is
protected speech under the First Amendment because it was considered commentary on
social concerns); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (holding that a Ku Klux
Klan leader's advocacy against rights for minorities is a protected form of political
expression under the First Amendment).
2011] 507
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amendment. 4 9 To justify restricting speech, a government actor or
entity "must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."5 0 In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,' the Court enumerated "well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech" that were not intended to warrant
constitutional protections because they were "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas."52 Examples of unprotected forms of speech
were "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting." 53  One month later, the Court created the category of
commercial speech, which was intended to be another form of speech
not contemplated to be protected by the First Amendment.5 4  In
Valentine v. Chrestensen," Justice Owen Roberts opined that "the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." 56 This restraint, however, cannot be
found anywhere in the Constitution and even members of the
majority decision expressed regret over this hasty decision.57 This
opinion conveyed a brash, but intuitive idea that commercial speech
did not fall within the intended First Amendment protections.
More than thirty years later, the Court relented that there must
be some forms of constitutionally protected commercial speech.59 In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,60 the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that
49 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).
50 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
5 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
52 Id. at 571-72.
1 Id. at 572.
54 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942).
16 Id at 54.
57 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing the Chrestensen decision as "casual, almost offhand" and unable to "survive[]
reflection").
58 Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120 HARV. L.
REv. 1892, 1892 (2007) (noting that " 'few of us would march our sons and daughters off to
war to preserve the citizen's right' to watch Super Bowl commercials") (quoting Young v.
Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
59 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
60 Id
[Vol. 27508
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prohibited pharmacists from advertising drug prices was at issue.61
The Court invalidated the statute because the government could not
"completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity." 62  Speech that solely
pertains to a commercial transaction is not "so removed from any
exposition of ideas" that it may escape the protections of the First
Amendment.63 The Court was careful to assert that it did "not hold
that [commercial speech] can never be regulated in any way,""
making clear that "false or misleading" speech regarding commercial
transactions may not be protected,65 as well as speech regarding
* 66illegal commercial transactions.
Soon after the Virginia Citizens decision, a multi-prong
analysis to determine whether particular commercial speech should
be protected by the First Amendment was created by the Court.67 In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,68 the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited utility
companies from advocating electricity use in advertisements was at
issue. 69  The Court created a four-factor test to determine if the
commercial speech should be protected:
For commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.7 0
The Court invalidated the statute because it was overly
burdensome on the utility companies and there were reasonable
61 Id. at 749-50.
62 Id. at 773.
63 Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572).
6 Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
65 Id. at 771-72.
66 Id. at 772.
67 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Conun'n, 447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980).
8 Id.
69 Id. at 566.
70 id
2011] 509
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alternatives to the severity of outright prohibition on advertisement,
thus failing the fourth prong.7 1 However, the fourth prong "need not
be the absolute least restrictive means to achieve desired end[s];
rather, restrictions require only a reasonable fit between
government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends."72 Despite this holding, the tension between "an individual's
right to free speech and the state's power to regulate" is still prevalent
in both federal and state courts73 and some scholars still insist that
commercial speech should fall outside the protections of the First
Amendment.74 Conversely, scholars with a different viewpoint argue
that distinguishing commercial speech from other forms has no basis
in the Constitution, and therefore should not be done. Adding to
the confusion was the Court's failure to adhere to the Central Hudson
holding as the sole manner to determine whether commercial speech
warranted Constitutional protection.76 Recently, Justices have
progressively begun to narrow the difference between commercial
and pure speech.
The Second Circuit has dealt head-on with the
constitutionality of section 20-453, but has reached inconsistent
results.78 In United States v. Bery," various groups of artists dealing
in paintings, photography, and sculpting sought an injunction against
New York City from enforcing the section 20-453 requirement that a
" Id. at 570-71.
72 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 713 ("What our decisions require is a fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends - a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable." (quoting Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))).
n Note, Making Sense ofHybrid Speech, supra note 26, at 2845.
74 See id. at 2845-46; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 488 (1985) (arguing that there is "reason to exclude
commercial advertising from the protection of the first amendment").
7s Note, Making Sense ofHybrid Speech, supra note 26, at 2845-46.
76 David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv. 359,
383 (1990) (noting that courts are left to "guess at the proper way to categorize speech in any
given case" as a result of the United States Supreme Court's inability to definitively
determine commercial speech protections).
n See, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial'
speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech.").
78 See United States v. Bery, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Mastrovincenzo,
435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006).
" 97 F.3d 689.
510 [Vol. 27
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license is required to sell their goods on the street.8 0 The city argued
that the regulation did not act as a censorship mechanism, but rather
was a quality assurance mechanism that kept the streets free from
unscrupulous merchant congestions." Moreover, it was not limiting
the artists' ability to express themselves, but simply regulating the
channels by which the artists could sell that self-expression.82 The
court disagreed, granted the injunction, and held that First
Amendment rights are not waived simply when speech is sold.83
Great deference was given to the plaintiffs' argument that "the street
marketing is in fact part of the message of [the artists'] art" and
section 20-453 unconstitutionally impinges on that right of
84
expression. Lastly, the court provided a framework in which such
speech restrictions may be valid: "A content-neutral regulation may
restrict the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided it is
'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest' and
'leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.' ,85
Subsequently, New York City "consented to the Bery injunction and
... stipulated that it would no longer enforce § 20-453" against the
unlicensed sale of paintings, photographs, and sculptures on the
street.86
Ten years later, the Second Circuit again dealt with the
constitutionality of section 20-453 as vendors of clothing with
"graffiti designs" sought First Amendment protection in United
States v. Mastrovincenzo." This court broke with the opinion in
Bery and found that the regulation was "content-neutral" because it
" 'serves purposes unrelated to the content of [the regulated]
expression.' "88 Such purposes are "(1) keeping the public streets
free of congestion for the convenience and safety of its citizens, (2)
maintaining the 'tax base and economic viability of the City,' and (3)
preventing the sale of 'stolen, defective or counterfeit
so Id. at 691.
s1 Id. at 697.
82 Id at 695.
83 Id. at 695-99 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988)).
84 Bery, 97 F.3d at 696.
Id at 697 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
86 Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 82.
87 Id. at 8 1.
Id. at 99 (quoting Hobbs v. Cnty. of Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 150 (2d Cir. 2005)).
2011] 511
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merchandise[].' "" This resolved the question of content-neutrality
left open by the court in Bery as it pertains to section 20-453.90
Because the regulation was a reasonable and narrowly tailored statute
that served several significant government interests, and provided
other opportunities for the vendors to distribute their expressions, the
statute was held to be constitutional.9 '
New York State courts have displayed a similar disjointedness
as their federal counterparts. One year before the Supreme Court's
decision in Virginia Citizens, the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with a substantially similar fact pattern, but held that a statute
that prohibited pharmacists from advertising sale prices of drugs was
constitutional. 92  In Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 93 this kind of
advertising was not afforded First Amendment protections by the
court because the regulation only regulated the "manner in which
commercial advertising could be distributed."9 ' In the majority
opinion, the court recognized the dissonance left in the wake by the
Chrestensen decision, but stood firm in the belief that commercial
speech had less protections than "pure" speech. 95
Subsequent to the aforementioned United States Supreme
Court decisions that interpreted the commercial speech doctrine, New
York State courts attempted to formulate rules therewith. In People
v. Professional Truck Leasing Systems, Inc.,96 a city ordinance that
prohibited "operating a vehicle for the purpose of advertising
business other than its own" was upheld as constitutional. 97 In
reaching the decision, the court applied the four-factor test set forth in
Central Hudson to determine "the validity of government restrictions
on commercial speech." 98 The court relied heavily on the opinion in
People v. Target Advertising Inc., 99 which dealt with the exact statute
89 id
90 Id. at 99 n.16.
91 Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 100.
92 Urowsky v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of New York, 342 N.E.2d 583, 586 (N.Y. 1975).
9 Id. at 583.
94 Id. at 587.
9 Id
96 713 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Crim. Ct. 2000).
9 Id. at 652, 656.
9 Id. at 655.
9 708 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Crim. Ct. 2000).
512 [Vol. 27
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/1
FIRST AMENDMENT
in controversy here.'o
First, the statute met the first prong of the test because it did
"not purport to ban only advertising that concerns unlawful activity
or is misleading."o'0 The second factor was met because the statute
was promoting a substantial government interest as it sought to
"promote traffic safety and alleviate traffic congestion."' 02 The third
factor of directly advancing a governmental interest was satisfied
because it "lessens the amount of potential traffic on the City
streets."1 03 Finally, the fourth factor ensuring that the statute was not
more extensive than necessary was satisfied because " 'the ban here
is narrowly tailored to remove a class of vehicles from the street ...
[which] fulfills the City's purpose of reducing the overall number of
vehicles congesting the City's streets.' "' Because all of the
Central Hudson factors were satisfied, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the law.'0o Central Hudson has played a critical
role in the New York courts' jurisprudence regarding the
classification of certain brands of speech as commercial speech. 106
In final consideration, the First Amendment provides
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."107 The principle underlying that protection was "to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."108 Initially, the Court
did not intend for commercial speech to fall within this protection. 0 9
However, the Court gradually tinkered with this commercial speech
doctrine and created principles that allow such speech to be
protected,"o but this philosophy has morphed so frequently that
'" Id. at 598.
101 Profl Truck Leasing Sys., Inc., 713 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
102 id
103 Id.
104 Id. (quoting Target Adver. Inc., 708 N.Y.S.2d at 605).
105 id
'" See New York v. Learning Annex, Inc., 589 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28-29 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1992) (holding that a regulation that prevented magazines distribution via sidewalk bins was
unconstitutional because the government interest was not significant); Galaxy Rental Serv. v.
State, 452 N.Y.S.2d 921, 925 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1982) (holding that a statute prohibiting
advertising specific apartments for sale was unconstitutionally restrictive as there were less
restrictive means available to accomplish the statute's goal).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1os Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
10 Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
110 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72; Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
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lower courts struggle to keep up with the pace."' "Doctrinal
incoherence results from this theoretical underdevelopment. Without
a coherent underlying rationale as to why commercial speech should
receive less First Amendment protection, courts struggle to determine
both which speech should be considered commercial and what
standard the government must meet in order to regulate it."" 2 This
"doctrinal incoherence" makes it extremely difficult to determine
from the outset of an action whether one form of speech will be
deemed commercial "[u]nless a case has facts very much like those
of a prior case."113
In response to this set of incongruent precedents by the United
States Supreme Court, the lower courts have demonstrated a
propensity to favor governmental regulation over the rights of
commercial speech. Although the Bery decision greatly expanded
protections for different vehicles of commercial speech,"l 4 the
Second Circuit seemingly put its foot down in the Mastrovincenzo
decision by limiting certain forms of commercial speech, such as
graffiti designed t-shirts.' 's Mastrovincenzo shifted the burden to the
party seeking free speech protections in commercial transactions to
show that the goods possess a dominant self-expressive purpose,
because if the good has "a dominant non-expressive purpose" it will
not likely garner First Amendment protections.116 Once established,
the Second Circuit shifts the burden to the government entity to show
that the regulation over such a commercial good is reasonable,
narrowly tailored to a government interest, and does not leave the
vendor without alternative avenues of dispensing the self-expressive
good. 117
New York courts have also been victims of the lack of
certainty by the United States Supreme Court as to what precise test
determines constitutional protections. In Larsen, the court primarily
relied on Second Circuit precedent in Bery and Mastrovincenzo to
1n Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, supra note
58, at 1893.
112 Id. at 1897.
113 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv.
627, 631 (1990).
114 Bery, 97 F.3d at 696.
" Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 81.
116 Id. at 95.
"' Id. at 100.
514 [Vol. 27
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hold that the First Amendment was not intended to protect the speech
printed on novelty condoms simply because the speech related to
current events." 8  The court held that the statute was a "content-
neutral" regulation that is "narrowly tailored and leaves the
[d]efendants with ample alternative channels of communication."" 9
In fact, the court expresses a sense of frustration with the lack of
definitive precedent by the higher courts over a determinative
standard for commercial speech protection. 120 "[C]ommon sense
dictates that topical novelty products, notwithstanding their
expressive packaging, are not inherently similar to books, newspapers
and pamphlets. To hold otherwise would render the written matter
exception meaningless."1 21
In reaching similar outcomes to Larsen, the courts in
Professional Truck Leasing Systems, Inc.122 and Target Advertising
Inc.123 relied mainly on the United States Supreme Court holding in
Central Hudson, which is one of the few precedents that set forth
criteria in determining whether certain commercial speech warrants
First Amendment protections.124 Both courts were faced with the
constitutionality of an ordinance that prohibited the use of a vehicle
to act as an advertisement for any business but the business that
owned the vehicle.125 The four-factor test that was applied is more
thorough than the Second Circuit's lesser standard. Whereas the
Second Circuit standard requires commercial speech regulation to be
reasonable, narrowly-tailored to serve a significant, and provide for
alternative means of expression,126 the Central Hudson standard
further insists that the speech pertain to lawful activity, that the
speech is not misleading, and directly advance the substantial
government interest. 127  The latter test is the more prudent one to
apply as it imposes a heavier burden on commercial speech
regulation.
118 Larsen, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
"9 Id. at 718.
120 id
121 id.
122 Prof'1 Truck Leasing Sys., Inc., 713 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
123 Target Adver. Inc., 708 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
124 Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
125 Profl Truck Leasing Sys., Inc., 713 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53.
126 Bery, 97 F.3d at 697.
127 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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Commercial speech may be more incentivized to produce
inaccurate or untruthful statements to the public because the goal is
always to make a profit.128 Regulations over such speech are crucial
"for listeners trying to find truth, wisdom, or other insight"1 29 in order
to prevent predatory commercial practices from trying to take
advantage of such listeners. 130 Furthermore, this stricter standard
inhibits overbearing governmental regulation on speech as a
principle.' 1 Finally, there are "many types of nonpolitical speech
[that] receive protection greater than that afforded commercial
speech" and it is thus illogical to single out commercial speech.132
Scholars have argued that the limitations placed upon commercial
speech, in particular by the United States Supreme Court, is an effort
to convey "that the constitutional function of communication is to
inform an audience of citizens about matters pertinent to democratic
decision making."' 33 As evidenced by the New York courts'
application of a different analysis, there is a substantial need for a
uniform system to determine the outright constitutional protections of
commercial speech.134  The courts should reflect a congruency in
commercial speech review and the burden is on the United States
Supreme Court to produce one.135
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128 Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, supra note
58, at 1895.
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132 Id. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 113, at 633 ("The Framers never expressed an
interest in protecting literature either, but the idea that the first amendment protects artistic
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